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Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in
Dispute System Design?
And What We Should [Not] Do About
It: Lessons from International and
Domestic Fronts
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
I. INTRODUCTION: IS DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN (“DSD”) A
PROFESSIONAL FIELD READY FOR A CODE OF ETHICS?
The process by which new fields of knowledge and practice are
defined, developed, and demarcated from other fields has long been
described by sociologists of the professions.1 As new competencies are
created and studied, the progression from initial theorization, to the
development of practice protocols, training and education, attempts
at credentialing, and “monopolization of expertise,” to the develop-
ment of “best practices” and ethics codes, marches on to the eventual
state of exclusionary practices, such as degree requirements, licens-
ing, and formal professional discipline. All the basic professions
(medicine, law and clergy) have gone through this process and many
other professions exist in different stages of this inexorable march
toward “professionalization”—e.g. nursing, social work, psychological
counseling, building contracting, hairstyling, and  paraprofessionals
in medicine and law.  Recent work by an interdisciplinary team of
scholars, including Howard Gardner (education and cognitive psy-
chology), Mihaly Csizkszentmihalyi (social psychology) and William
Damon (developmental psychology and education) has explored how
* A.B. Chettle Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure,
Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to the Harvard Negotiation Law Review
for hosting this stimulating symposium and to Robert Bordone, Howard Gadlin,
Christopher Honeyman, and Peter Reilly for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., ANDREW D. ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY
OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986); MARGALI S. LARSON,
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1979).
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professions attempt to constitute “cultures” of professional excel-
lence, using both internal and external social and ethical commit-
ments.2 Whether a field or discipline requires ethical standards to be
considered a profession remains an issue of some debate due to its
tendency to “exclude” some professions or to mark them as separate
from important lay expertise and service.
The field of conflict resolution, broadly defined, is currently at
what I would describe as a “mid-point” in this quest for formal recog-
nition as a profession. There are competing theories of practice in
each of the constituent fields. Mediators advocate  evaluative,
facilitative,3 transformative,4  understanding,5 narrative,6 and eclec-
tic models of mediation.7  Negotiators contrast different models or ap-
proaches to negotiation, pitting adversarial-competitive models
“against” collaborative and problem-solving models, with still others
suggesting negotiation is more often “mixed” in its conceptual goals
and behaviors (creating and claiming value).8  Another set of dispute
resolution professionals offer yet a different set of practices for arbi-
tration,9 where there are already some relatively established practice
protocols. The larger, more inclusive, field of conflict resolution has
2. See also HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETH-
ICS MEET (2001) (exploring and contrasting the internal ethics and integrity of the
profession of geneticist-scientist with the more externally directed profession of
journalism).
3. See Leonard Riskin, The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
4. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(2nd Ed. 2006).
5. See generally GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT:
MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008).
6. See generally JOHN WINSLADE, GERALD D. MONK & GERALD MONK, NARRA-
TIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
7. See generally CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY
AND ETHICS (2006) (summarizing presentations of different models of mediation); Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions,
Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217 (1995); DEBORAH KOLB ET AL.,
WHEN TALK WORKS-PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (1994).
8. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Why Hasn’t the World Gotten to Yes?, 22 NEGOT. J. 485 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possi-
ble or Desirable in International Arbitration?, in ME´LANGES EN L-HONNEUR DE PIERRE
TERCIER  (P. Gauch, F. Werro & P. Pichonnaz, ed. 2008).
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developed  more or less agreed-to knowledge bases,10 and a robust
effort to develop codes, standards of practices and ethical rules.11
A few states have begun processes to require specific numbers of
training hours and some form of certification, especially with respect
to mediation within the courts.12 Recently, the American Bar Associ-
ation’s Section on Dispute Resolution published a report from its
Task Force on Improving the Quality of Mediation13 that addressed
questions of quality, ethics, subject matter expertise, and other issues
related to the choice and use of mediators. In a similar vein, a new
international group called the International Mediation Institute,
based in The Hague, The Netherlands, is also engaged in a project
to develop standards of Competency in International Mediation,
10. As evidenced by the growing number of both school and degree programs, and
professionally based courses and texts in all fields of dispute resolution – arbitration,
mediation, negotiation, facilitation and consensus building, as well as dispute system
design, see, e.g., CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA S. MERCHANT, DESIGNING CON-
FLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING HEALTHY AND PRODUCTIVE ORGA-
NIZATIONS  (1995); WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING
SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF  CONFLICT (1988); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & DAVID CRUICKSHANK,
BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES (2006); MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ROBERT C. BORDONE, eds.,
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2005); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARY MODEL (2005); ANDREA SCHNEIDER & CHRISTO-
PHER HONEYMAN eds., THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK (2006).
11. See, e.g., ABA LITIGATION SECTION, STANDARDS FOR NEGOTIATION OF SETTLE-
MENTS (2005); AAA ETHICS RULES FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS (2006); AAA-ABA-
ACR STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (2005); GEORGETOWN-CPR PROPOSED MODEL RULE
FOR LAWYERS AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRALS AND GEORGETOWN-CPR PRINCIPLES FOR ADR
PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2001), available at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/final-
Provider.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009). SPIDR GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN OF INTE-
GRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS (2001). For related
efforts, see also Peter Adler, A Credo for Facilitators, mediate.com, July 24, 2008 and
Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters,
May 21, 2008.
12. See, e.g., FLORIDA, MASSACHUSETTS,  CALIFORNIA, DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFI-
CATION STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS SERVING IN COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PRO-
GRAMS FOR CIVIL CASES (California Judicial Council, Notice for Public Comment by
July 7, 2008).
13. ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE QUAL-
ITY OF MEDIATION (April 2006-March 2007) Final Report (convened to consider a na-
tional credential in mediation, concluding that market conditions made it not feasible
and suggesting other indicators of mediator quality to be further studied).
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including a specialized Inter-Cultural Mediator Competency Certifi-
cation.14 Similar optional and private, i.e. not state sanctioned, certi-
fication programs exist for arbitrators.15
Even the relatively newest forms of dispute resolution practice
have begun developing professional associations and discussion of ap-
propriate standards, practice protocols and ethics, such as IAP216
(the International Association of Public Participation, which includes
mediators, public policy facilitators, and consensus builders) and the
Deliberative Democracy Network.17
As an ethicist, scholar, and practitioner, I have participated in a
variety of efforts to specify the professional content of work and eth-
ics standards for many of these dispute resolution professions. As
Chair of the Georgetown-CPR Commission on Ethics and Standards
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”), I helped convene a diverse
commission of practitioners and consumers to draft suggested ethical
standards for lawyers acting as third party neutrals in a variety of
roles, and worked with a committee to specify standards and princi-
ples for organizations providing ADR services.18
As a member of the self-appointed “Senior Mediators Group,” I
participated in an effort to develop a “credo” for mediators, sug-
gesting, among other values, that mediators, particularly in public
policy disputes should:
1. Do no harm;
2. Involve a broad array of interested and affected
stakeholders;
3. Facilitate maximum opportunities for participation and
voice of participants;
14. See Draft Competency Certification Scheme, www.IMImediation.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2009).
15. See The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, www.arbitrators.org (offering
courses and credentials, including degrees, etc. in arbitration and other dispute reso-
lution services, “seeking to set global standards for professional education in dispute
resolution”) (last visisted Mar. 12, 2009).
16. See the homepage for the International Association for Public Participation,
http://www.iap2.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) for organization’s goals, training pro-
grams and information about facilitated public policy mediation, deliberation and de-
cision making.
17. See, e.g., The Deliberative Democracy Consortium, http://www.deliberative-
democracy.net (last visited Mar. 14, 2009); The Collaborative Policy Center, http://
www.csus.edu/ccp (last visited Mar. 14, 2009); The Policy Consensus Initiative, http://
www.policyconsensus.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
18. See generally CPR PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
11.
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4. Encourage participants to develop their own agreements on
process and ground rules;
5. Encourage participants to develop (and understand the sig-
nificance of) decision rules and voting procedures;
6. Encourage participant recognition of opportunities for joint,
and not only, individual, gain;
7. Require that parties express and explain their reasons and
justifications for views, arguments, proposals and needs;
8. Provide an atmosphere of fair hearing and respect for all
participants;
9. Seek to explore creative and tailored decisions and solutions
to problems, issues and disputes;
10. Be impartial, unbiased and “clean” (with adequate disclo-
sures) with respect to   their relationships to parties;
11. Facilitate open dialogue, discussion and deliberation be-
tween and among parties;
12. Encourage and educate for enhanced capacity of parties to
participate in decision making that affects them;
13. Probe the practical implementation issues and conse-
quences of all agreements reached;
14. Monitor the parties’ process and decision rules, consistent
with whatever law, rules or other governing materials are
applicable to the context;
15. Ensure an atmosphere of respectful awareness and sensi-
tivities to differences, whether substantive, institutional,
social and cultural;
16. Avoid presiding over any outcomes which would be “unfair”
or “unjust” to participants or those affected by decision
making of the parties.19
And now, as one of the newest strands of this new profession,
Dispute System Design, begins to consolidate definitions, skills, tech-
niques, knowledge, and practices, the question is raised:  Should
there be a separate set of ethics standards or guidelines for those who
design “systems” of dispute  resolution for institutions or other par-
ties with recurring disputes and internal processes for their
resolution?
19. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a
New Practice, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 63, 105-10 (2002). This “credo” was never formally
endorsed by any group, including the self-appointed Senior Mediators Group at which
it was first discussed.
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In this essay I explore some of the issues implicated in the ques-
tion of whether DSD should develop its own Code or Credo of Ethics,
specifying good and bad practices of those professionals who design
systems of dispute resolution in recurring or aggregated conflict situ-
ations. Defining what an ethics code is or should be is problematic
enough. Should an ethics code serve the consumers of services or the
providers of services (they will be constructed differently depending
on who the audience is)? At what level of aspiration or code should
rules be designed? For many years the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers (“the CPR”) con-
tained three levels: Canons (aspirational statements of good prac-
tices), Disciplinary Rules (specific rules for which lawyers could be
sanctioned and disciplined by appropriate ethics bodies), and Ethical
Considerations (fuller textual commentary designed to explicate the
meaning of rules and good practices with no disciplinary bite). When
the CPR was changed to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983, the form changed to “simple” blackletter rules with accompany-
ing Comments to explicate the rules (in part because many thought
the aspirational canons and ethical considerations were hardly
observed).
Does drafting ethical “rules” cut with too blunt a knife — oppos-
ing what is prohibited or permitted in simplistic and binary terms for
discipline that is contrary to the more nuanced form of judgment that
most professionals must exercise to behave well or with due consider-
ation of situations that do not fall into easy black and white catego-
ries? Should ethics codes aim high for encouragement (“best
practices”),  the mean or “norm” of practice (“good practices”), or for
the bottom or bad practices that should be prohibited, condemned
and disciplined (“worst practices”)? When is ethical practice the same
as effective practice? When does practice become so poor it raises is-
sues of ethics? Is malpractice an ethics matter?
Those who perform dispute system design services come from
several different constituent professions, including law, city and ur-
ban planning,20 social work, psychology, political science, journal-
ism,21 and those who are newly educated in formal degree programs
20. See, e.g., JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES (2001).
21. Some of the eclectic founders of this field come from a wide variety of back-
grounds including John Marks of Search for Common Ground who began in the State
Department, was a journalist and now designs peace seeking programs through me-
dia and other interventions and Patrick Phear who became a mediator after a career
as a dentist (is resolving conflicts better/easier than pulling teeth?).
\\server05\productn\H\HNR\14-1\HNR111.txt unknown Seq: 7 22-JUL-09 13:27
Winter 2009] Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design 201
in conflict resolution22 or self-educated facilitators. So, one important
preliminary issue is what self-constituted group could effectively and
legitimately develop the content of such ethical standards? And, per-
haps even more problematically, what enforcement of such standards
could there be without an underlying professional organization or
structure? Each of the above mentioned fields and professions has its
own set of professional standards, or as some would say, the values of
craft or calling that might be compromised or diluted by a more eclec-
tically formed field. What are the “core values” of a dispute system
designer?
Furthermore, given the wide range of activities that could be in-
cluded in any definition of system design (developing procedures and
processes for resolving or handling internal organizational conflicts,
settling and paying claims in adversarial mass legal actions (e.g. con-
sumer, employment, or torts23), mass human rights violations,24 gov-
ernmental and citizen disputes (e.g. negotiated rule-making or reg-
neg,)25 peace seeking or peacekeeping in on-going or post-conflict sit-
uations among nations, ethnic, religious or other cultural groups, or
facilitating competing groups in seeking good political outcomes, such
as in the field now denominated “deliberative democracy”),26 is it pos-
sible to develop a general enough set of standards of good practices
that will provide guidance in a field characterized by many different
contexts and locations of use?
Finally, as the work we have discussed includes both domestic,
and  multi-national and international forms of dispute system design,
22. See George Mason University Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution,
http://icar.gmu.edu/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) which offers both masters and PhD
degree programs; Other universities also offer degree programs in conflict manage-
ment and related fields, both as separate degree programs and as elements, speciali-
zation or certificates within other programs. See, e.g., American Association of Law
Schools, Section of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Programs in Conflict Resolution;
Association of Conflict Resolution, Programs in Conflict Resolution.
23. Francis McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensa-
tion Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2009); KENNETH FEINBERG, WHAT IS
LIFE WORTH? (Public Affairs 2006).
24. See Andrea Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and Tran-
sitional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289 (2009).
25. Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 Geo. L. J 1
(1982); Susskind, et.al, supra note 10; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997).
26. JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY AND DEMOC-
RACY (MIT Press 1996); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster, ed., 1998); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 Nev. L.J. 347
(2004-2005); Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills and
Selves, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 503 (2008).
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an important question is whether ethics or standards can be de-
scribed and enforced across cultural and political boundaries and ju-
risdictions (what ethicists have labeled the universality vs.
particularity problem). As I will more fully explore below, recent
work on “ethics” in good works in international economic and human-
itarian aid is raising similar questions about how transborder, trans-
disciplinary, well-intentioned work can be monitored and scrutinized
for ensuring best possible outcomes and disciplining of bad acts and
bad effects.27
I will state my views at the outset and then explore, with exam-
ples, and my own analysis, why even though we clearly have ethical
issues to consider and deal with in this nascent field, at this point in
time I still think it is premature to draft a separate ethics code for our
field. Since I have long advocated for separate ethics codes for
mediators and arbitrators28 (including in international settings29), I
will have to explain why dispute system design is different or, in my
view, “not quite ready for prime-time” in terms of ethics regulation.
On the other hand, just because I do not think the field of DSD is
ready for a formal ethics code, does not mean that I do not see some
very important ethics issues in the field. I hope this essay will con-
tribute to an on-going discussion of those issues so that in time, after
deliberation on some of the more controversial issues, we might be
able to begin to specify our core ethical principles.30
27. See, e.g., ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: EXTENT & LIMITS (Jean-Marc
Coicaud & Daniel Warner eds., 2001) (exploring international ethics issues from a
traditional (statist), analytic (universality-cosmopolitan vs. particularity) and critical
perspective, with a focus on both principles and institutions needed for international
ethics in diplomacy, war, foreign aid, etc.)
28. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
631 (1996-1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution:
New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities,
38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in
Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 153 (1999-2000); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000).
29. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 18-22. R
30. I can’t resist at this point describing my own naivete´ when I set about some
15 years ago to delineate what I thought were “core” and uncontroversial ethical is-
sues in mediation, including conflicts of interests, fees, etc. See Menkel-Meadow, Pro-
fessional Responsibility for Third Party Neutrals, 11 (9) ALTERNATIVES (Sept. 1993);
see also Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many “Cs” of Professional Responsibility
and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2000-2001). What turned up in-
stead was a maelstrom of controversy and disagreement about downstream/upstream
conflicts of interests in law practice and mediation and arbitration, and whether fees
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First, we must identify the method by which we should develop
ethical reasoning in DSD: either inductively, what the ethical
problems are or might be (reasoning from examples and cases
presented with ethical dilemmas) or deductively determine what core
principles our field should be expressing, which should then be ap-
plied to particular cases. Then we will have to specify rules, stan-
dards, principles, and the organizational or institutional apparatus
for enforcement of those standards. Pending clear enforcement mech-
anisms, we must also consider what should happen in this “interim”
period of discussion and debate, before codes and rules are framed,
but while problematic activities are still occurring. Are “DSDers” sub-
ject to the professional codes of their professions of origin for their
acts as DSDers?31
II. THE INDUCTIVE METHOD OF ETHICS: SOME EXAMPLES OF
QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES AND ISSUES IN DSD
The inquiry of whether ethics rules or standards should be
promulgated for the new field of DSD stems from its use and
problems that have already been exposed. In this section, I will con-
sider and illustrate some examples of core ethical dilemmas and is-
sues that arise in the use of a professional to design a system of
could be contingent, paid by one party only, or a third party, or waived for some par-
ties, but not all. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Resolution Professionals, 44 UCLA L.
Rev. 1871 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation: A Roadmap
of Critical Issues, 4(2) DISP. RES. Mag. 3 (1997). As ADR practice has both matured
and ventured into new forms and locations, the “ethics” of particular practices contin-
ues to evolve, so my basic point is that a new field, like DSD, derived from ADR, needs
some “habitus” or common routines and enough experience (PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUT-
LINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE, 1977) of practice, before we can “codify” anything.
This does not mean, of course, that we can’t “know it when we see it” (bad conduct,
worthy of some condemnation, apologies to Justice Stewart, concurring opinion in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, (1964)).
31. For many years, in the absence of special ethical rules and codes for
mediators and arbitrators, this question has been asked about lawyers serving in
those capacities. There are now such ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators but
relatively little enforcement. Lawyers can be disciplined for any act which would con-
stitute professional misconduct, regardless of whether the act is formally performed
as a lawyer. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2009). (Thus, real estate,
sports, entertainment or other agents who have law degrees and licenses can lose
their legal license for deceptions or lies committed while serving as agents. Recall that
both Presidents Nixon and Clinton were disbarred for acts of deception while they
were President of the United States.).
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dispute resolution for a wide variety of different clients, organiza-
tions and causes.32
A. For What Purpose Are We Designing a Dispute Resolution
System?
Is DSD a “neutral” activity? Consider the following: A major cul-
tural institution seeks a DSD professional to design a new internal
grievance system for its employees. Some of the employees are union-
ized (security guards and other low wage employees) and others (mid-
wage and more professional workers are not). After several informa-
tion gathering sessions with institutional managers, it becomes clear
that one of the intended purposes of designing an internal employ-
ment conflict system is to marginalize and make unpopular the
union’s contractual grievance system (usually utilizing some form of
arbitration) and to structure an environment in which union support
is eroded.
Is this a purpose a DSD professional should facilitate with her
expertise? What, if like me, the DSD professional was a former labor
and employment lawyer particularly concerned about employee
choice, rights of collective bargaining and due process?  When, in this
case, I asked that union stewards and employee representatives be-
come part of an internal planning committee for the internal griev-
ance system design process, it became clear that management was
not interested in encouraging multilevel participation and preferred,
instead, a top-down designed system.
What should a DSD professional do? I withdrew from this partic-
ular work, suggesting a few other names of professionals whom the
institution could consult, and some reading materials. I suspect—but
do not know—that many of the people I offered in referral would have
reactions similar to mine. Consider how many mediators, facilitators
and other ADR professionals of the first generation also have employ-
ment, labor, civil rights and anti-discrimination backgrounds. I imag-
ine that at some point another DSD professional who would do the
work would be found.33
32. A disclaimer – all examples are taken from my own practice (with names of
clients changed or concealed to protect both confidentiality and the “guilty”).  Some
examples are in the public domain.
33. One reader of this paper suggested that the initial commitments and profes-
sions of origin of the first generation of dispute system designers might be particu-
larly important in situations like this.  For example, the former labor and
discrimination lawyer, former divorce lawyer, former social worker or city planner
might have commitments to social justice that a “deracinated” or specifically trained
dispute system designer might not.  On the question of whether dispute resolution
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In another example, discussed more fully below, I report on an
internal dispute resolution system for employees that was clearly de-
signed to discourage employees from filing any formal employment
litigation claims or charges (a common and more or less legitimate
purpose) but one which can be used to have an “in terroram” effect on
employees with potentially legitimate claims. In one matter with
which I am familiar, a multi-national corporation used its domesti-
cally created employment dispute system to give workers outside of
the United States the perception that they had grievance and conflict
resolution rights, which appeared generous because domestic employ-
ment laws do not necessarily apply abroad.34 But, in fact, the em-
ployer used the system to deflect employment disputes and litigation,
and failed to enforce its own procedures and outcomes.
Who is ethically responsible for such design? The original design-
ers of the domestic employee grievance system? Or, only those who
implement and transfer its use from one arena to another?
When DSD professionals, lawyers, or other professionals35 do not
feel ethically comfortable with the uses to which their services will be
put, they can usually withdraw or reject a particular assignment.36
professionals in general should be neutral, see BERNARD MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY:
CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2004).
34. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), the United States
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibiting discrimination in employment did not
apply outside of the United States.  This decision was subsequently reversed by Con-
gressional action. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991).  However, in my experience as a mediator of such cases, many employees do
not think that they have any American legal rights for work performed outside of the
United States.  In general, courts will look to Congressional intent for the decision
about whether a particular statutory scheme is intended to have extraterritorial ef-
fect, and many domestic labor and employment protections have been held not to ap-
ply abroad. Cf. O’Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 2008 WL 344710 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
35. As I write this, an ethics issue in the field of court language translation and
interpretation has erupted.  A certified U.S. federal court translator of twenty-three
years broke confidentiality to denounce the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service
raids on a meat-packing plant in Iowa which, in his view, violated basic human rights.
In a powerful essay and a series of interviews, Dr. Erik Camayd-Freixas has defended
his decision to break neutrality and go public when he felt a “conflict of interest” be-
cause his translating services were being used to wrongfully convict undocumented
workers of identity theft. See Julia Preston, An Interpreter Speaking Up for Migrants,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2008, at 1; Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting after the Largest
ICE Raid in US History (June 13, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).  I also defended Professor Camayd’s actions. See Aqui y Ahora (Univision
television broadcast, July 22, 2008).
36. This is in contrast, for example, to the British “cab rank” rule which does not
entitle British barristers to turn down a “brief,” but which they do manage to control
and manipulate through other means. See Peter Tague, Criminal Defense in the U.K.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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Refusing to work, withdrawing on principle or ethical objections, and
referring  others to do the work  are somewhat analogous to the
“noisy withdrawal” problem faced by lawyers who learn that clients
are engaged in unlawful or unethical behavior and seek to withdraw
without violating client confidences.37
B. Selection of the DSD Professional: Serving Few or  Many?
As the above examples illustrate, the DSD professional usually
serves an institutional client. When should a DSD professional en-
gage in due diligence to determine who seeks the dispute system de-
sign and for what purpose, particularly, where, as above, there is
some evidence of conflicting interests within the organization? Con-
sider this next example: I am often engaged, as a member of the Asso-
ciation of American Law School Resource Corps,38 to facilitate and
organize strategic planning events for law schools. Usually the Dean
of the school is the contact person, but our protocol is that Resource
Corps facilitators communicate privately with virtually all faculty
members, senior administrative staff, and occasionally, some stu-
dents before convening meetings and planning the work. Sometimes
the request for facilitation may come from a faculty planning commit-
tee or the request might be initiated by a particular interest group on
the faculty. What should a DSD professional do when it becomes
clear, either before, or during the facilitation, planning, or structur-
ing of the process, that a particular interest group is using the pro-
cess for its own ends?39
37. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, The Duty or Option of Silence, 23 LAW & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 339 (1998); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of
Candor and the Bar’s Temptation of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243
(1998).
38. The AALS Resource Corps consists of a group of about twenty legal educators
who have been specifically trained to conduct strategic planning and other organiza-
tional retreats and conflict resolution programs for “developing the capacity for colle-
gial deliberation and decision-making” in law schools.  We perform our work without
fees. See AALS Resource Corps Resources Page, http://www.aals.org/re-
sources_resourcecorps.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  Some of us (and others not
part of this group) are also engaged, for fees, to perform similar functions for law
schools or universities who seek particular expertise outside of the Resource Corps.
See, e.g., Report of Center for Collaborative Governance, California State University
at Sacramento (2008) (on file with author).
39. In several cases in which some of us have worked, it has become clear that
one faculty group organized such planning events in order to expose decanal misman-
agement or other negative internal and private events in order to provoke a crisis or
effectuate a change of leadership.  I am familiar with at least one case in which this
strategy was successful.  The facilitator became the unknowing “tool” of a well organ-
ized and legitimated (through faculty committee structure) faculty faction.
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Once again, although the goal of this work may be to act “neu-
trally” or to serve “the organization’s best interest,” such overarching
principles may be difficult to observe when choices must be made
(specific interventions, exposure of secret or private meetings or
plans, advice for leaders or managers, withdrawals of service), partic-
ularly in cases where the DSD professional may be manipulated, ei-
ther by management, or the representatives of the organization who
have selected him. Obviously, good practice and due diligence suggest
that any DSD professional should undertake preliminary inquiries
about the organization, its constituents, and the reasons DSD is be-
ing sought, but in some cases, such issues may not emerge until the
consultation has begun or, where selection as a DSD professional is
competitive, candidates may not fully scrutinize or investigate those
who are hiring them.
C. Professional Responsibilities of the DSD Professional
There are a host of issues and ethical dilemmas that confront the
DSD professional before, during, and after engagement in dispute
system design. For example, should the DSD professional have par-
ticular subject matter, as well as process, expertise when undertak-
ing a matter? Increasingly, large corporations, universities, hospitals,
research facilities, and government departments are utilizing
Ombuds or Ethics Officers to develop internal complaint, grievance
and justice systems of various sorts. In situations where the organi-
zation’s mission (e.g. science, technology, religion) is highly special-
ized, should the DSD professional self-select away from that which he
does not know? Or is the DSD professional, like many lawyers, a
generalist who can prepare and learn about new fields and new orga-
nizational schemes?40
As organizations become more multi-national and multi-cultural,
should dispute system designers, like managers, mediators, and
other dispute resolution professionals have inter-cultural competen-
cies (see more below)?  The newly formed International Mediation In-
stitute  thinks so and has drafted standards and a protocol for
certification of mediators with intercultural competency,41 applying
specific standards, measures and client feedback.
40. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2009).
41. International Mediation Institute Independent Standards Commission, http:/
/www.imimediation.org/isc_list.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). See also Judith
Meyer, Mediators’ Alert: Now, Certification Goes Global, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIG. 57 (2008).
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Should a DSD professional ever advise a potential client that a
new design or any design of a dispute system is not necessary? Like
most professionals with particular expertise, when would a DSD pro-
fessional recommend against the use of her services on efficiency,
judgment, fairness, or other grounds, especially if she stands to earn
a fee?
Consider this example from my own experience: Virtually all of
the international bodies created by the Bretton Woods agreement
(the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and now, the
World Trade Organization) and the United Nations, as well as many
other non-governmental, and governmental international and multi-
national organizations, have created internal systems of conflict and
dispute resolution, particularly for their own employees. Indeed,
some have also created quite effective systems for external conflict
resolution. Companies selling goods offer online or other forms of
speedy and systematic complaint handling.42 The World Bank has
not only an internal and “integrated” conflict resolution system for its
own employees,43 but it offers a separate body to deal with com-
plaints of those affected by World Bank Projects,44 and a formal arbi-
tration system for private investor-state disputes (the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID). Many organi-
zations must craft internal (and external) dispute and complaint sys-
tems for a wide variety of constituents—customers, different classes
of employees, patients, doctors, students, union members, part-time
workers, vendors, suppliers, etc. and so the need for multiple or ever-
changing dispute systems may be great. What should a DSD profes-
sional do when confronted (as I have been) with organizations that
repeatedly engage consultants and dispute designers to design, and
then consult and evaluate dispute or conflict resolution programs re-
peatedly at a potential cost to the organization and adding confusion
about the stability of any one system?
Similarly (and related to section A above), what should a DSD
professional do when a particular consultation is designed to increase
42. See, e.g., E-bay Online Dispute Resolution, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/
disputes.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
43. World Bank Integrated Conflict Management System, http://www.world
bank.org/crs (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
44. World Bank Inspection Panel, http://www.worldbank.org/inspectionpanel
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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services and funding for dispute systems in institutional or organiza-
tional environments  in competition for funds with perhaps more de-
serving needs?45
As noted above, the DSD professional has a particularly tricky
ethical dilemma or conflict of interest in the organizational setting.
Most often hired by management or the “top” of an organization  to
design a conflict system for workers, customers, or others who consti-
tute the “bottom” or lateral tiers of an organization, to whom does a
DSD professional owe his or her professional duty? I was not a de-
signer of the dispute resolution system created for arbitration of
claims in the Dalkon Shield mass tort case,46 but I was a dispute
resolver (arbitrator) in the system, and I felt the ethical dilemmas of
presiding over a process I thought was sometimes ill-suited to its pur-
pose. I would have preferred a more mediational, rather than “arbi-
trary”/arbitration process. And, since I was a neutral “judge,” I could
feel the instrumental use of the arbitration process to efficiently allo-
cate limited funds (located within a bankruptcy proceeding) which
failed, in my view, to fully compensate or deliver justice to the users
(“victims” of the tort) of the system. Designers and managers of that
process were well qualified dispute resolution experts (some of whom
appeared at this Symposium – Francis McGovern and Kenneth Fein-
berg, along with Georgine Vairo), but they were responsible to the
bankruptcy judge and proceedings (and later to a Board managing
the limited Dalkon Shield Trust), not directly to the claimants.
Thus, in formal terms, DSD professionals also suffer from agent-
principal and moral hazard dilemmas and conflicts when users or
those affected by professional work are not the same as those di-
recting or controlling the work, who may seek implementation of
other values (efficiency, for example, over “justice” or even due
process).
Finally, what responsibility does a DSDer have for the imple-
mentation, evaluation, and enforcement mechanisms of any systems
45. From my own experience, I know that I have been asked to evaluate and re-
design a well financed international dispute resolution system and help make the
case for more internal funding.  Is it ethical or appropriate for me to recommend a
“top of the line,” multi-tiered and expensive program when there are competing and
perhaps better uses of the scarce resources inside the organization?  Is it enough to
say that that decision belongs to the managers and not to the system designer?  (I say
this as someone who was once queried by a member of the board of a major institution
about whether I would advise spending limited funds on an “integrated, multi-tier
dispute resolution system” or higher wages for the employees.).
46. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a
Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality,
Gender and Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (1998).
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he helps effectuate? Like the growing controversy in mediation prac-
tice about how much responsibility a mediator should have for imple-
mentation and enforcement of contracts, promises and outcomes,47 is
the DSDer’s job complete when the design is described or does re-
sponsibility extend to its appropriate development, implementation
and enforcement?
Consider another example: In a matter I alluded to above, I
served as a mediator in a multi-tiered, well designed, and much ac-
claimed multi-national corporation employee grievance system, in a
case involving employment outside of the United States. Both parties
(a discharged employee), and a representative from Human Re-
sources, appeared without counsel and participated willingly and ef-
fectively in a mediation which resulted in a signed agreement,
pursuant to all the standards, rules and policies of a written dispute
resolution program published by the corporation and distributed to
all employees. Many months later I was contacted by the employee
who indicated that the company had not fulfilled any of the condi-
tions of the mediation agreement and no lawyer would take his case
because in their view there were no legally enforceable employment
rights for an international worker and because, by the time of the
“breach,” the company had moved completely offshore.48  So why do I
think the application of the dispute systems program developed do-
mestically was merely window-dressing in the international context?
Does anyone, such as designers (internal and law firm lawyers), im-
plementers (managers), and participants (Human Resources)) have
ethical responsibility for this (participation in a dispute resolution
proceeding with probably no intention of adhering to its outcomes)?
If ethics or best practice standards have no possibility of enforce-
ment, what does that do to the legitimacy of the whole enterprise?
47. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Expanding the Ethical Obligations of the Medi-
ator: Mediator Accountability to Parties Not at the Table, in WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR
NEGOTIATORS 513-18 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004) (sug-
gesting that mediators have responsibility for parties not at the table and should 1)
consider the precedent effects of any agreement reached, 2) use their leadership roles
to do all they can to maximize joint gain for all relevant stakeholders, and 3) consider
the reputation and educative function of the highest quality of the field of mediation).
48. This situation would not preclude an effective lawsuit. Although corporate
headquarters are elsewhere, personal and subject matter jurisdiction requirements
for a lawsuit in the United States are met by sufficient minimum contacts and by the
fact that a contract was effectively formed under American law inside the United
States. More likely, the monetary stakes were not high enough and the likelihood of
enforcing the company’s non-monetary promises by injunction was very small.
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D. Outcomes/Consequences/Purposes of the Dispute System
As the final example above indicates, once a dispute system has
been designed and implemented, the question of what effects it has
on its intended beneficiaries and constituencies is another important
ethical question to be considered. Recently, at the First National Con-
gress on Mediation in Brazil, I learned about a very effective new
informal dispute resolution system. In the teeming “favellas” (shanty-
towns) of Rio de Janeiro, where drug lords and other gangs and com-
munity leaders essentially control the community, there are very
effective systems of dispute resolution for handling internal commu-
nity conflicts (so as to avoid contact with the police, courts and formal
authority). Systems I have come to call A5 (Alternative Alternative)
Dispute Resolution can be quite effective (as were the old dispute res-
olution systems of political ward leaders, or the “warlords” currently
operating in many countries), operating outside of any formal justice
system and providing peace and conflict solutions (often backed up by
threats of force), in a sort of “wise elder” arbitration system. Should
these gang leaders be credited as being effective dispute resolution
designers, even if the effects of their programming is to establish sys-
tems outside of any formal institutions and are often backed by vio-
lence, intimidation, and fear, not to mention the patronage, bias,
bribery and corruption that generally characterize such “outsider”
dispute resolution systems?
But if conflict is reduced, “peace” is achieved, and the parties are
satisfied, is that enough to characterize a dispute system design as
effective and ethical?  If not, whose principles are we using to judge
these systems? The participants or some external measure of justice
and ethics?
III. DEDUCTIVE ETHICS IN DSD: ARE THERE CORE ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES IN THE FIELD?
The examples I present above are only a few of the kinds of ethi-
cal dilemmas that a dispute system designer might face:
1. Who is the client? To whom is the DSDer accountable?
2. What is the purpose of the DSD? Are there any that are
illegitimate?
3. When should a DSDer withdraw or refuse to design or con-
sult about a particular process or system?
4. How does the DSDer make decisions or choose among alter-
natives and how are those choices/decisions justified?
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5. How much responsibility does the dispute designer have for
implementation, enforcement, consequences and effects of
the system he designs?
6. What responsibility does the DSDer bear for most efficient
and fair use of organizational/institutional/governmental re-
sources? (How should DSD be weighed against competing or-
ganizational and individual needs and resources?)
7. How much independence does the DSDer have from the cli-
ent? (When is the DSDesigner being used for illegitimate
ends?)
8. When does a DSDer have a conflict of interest (because of
different or competing needs within the client organization
or because of other work for other clients or other profes-
sional commitments)?
9. What are the sources of “values,” norms, ethics or good prac-
tices in DSD?
These general questions, then, suggest some general principles for
developing a set of “best practices” or ethics for the field of DSD cen-
tered around responsibility, accountability, fairness, independence,
judgment, participation (of affected parties) and pursuit of legitimate
goals. These “general” principles could be used to derive, deductively,
some general norms for the profession of DSD.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the tension of universality or gener-
ality and particularity or cultural differences may make agreement
on ethics principles difficult in DSD. I will make my arguments from
both domestic and international forms of dispute resolution—mass
torts and so-called “restorative or transitional justice.”49
If modern ADR theory and practice has taught us anything, it is
that modern process is plural.50 Claimants, victims, parties, defend-
ants, law reformers, judicial officers and other decision makers, and
policy analysts all may desire different things from a legal or dispute
resolution system. Some want vindication, others want apologies and
forgiveness; some want clear legal rules, others want more subtle
terms for ongoing relationships. Some desire punishment and
retribution.
49. See, e.g., RUTI G. TREITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does it Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
161 (2007).
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Le-
gal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
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As Lon Fuller so clearly described and anticipated in his many
articles on legal process,51 DSD is based on the idea that different
processes are necessary for different kinds of contexts and party
needs. So mediation is appropriate in ongoing relationships for its
flexibility, ability to tailor solutions to the particular needs of parties,
and opportunity for open-ended narratives and human interaction.
Arbitration is most appropriate when decisions and final settlements
are required, but choice of law (contract provisions), decision makers
(chosen by parties), privacy and flexibility on rules of procedure or
evidence are consensually desired by the parties. Some processes are
private (most forms of mediation and arbitration); other legal
processes are intended to be public (courts, international tribunals,
truth and reconciliation commissions) and parties may have different
needs and desires with respect to the transparency and privacy of the
legal harms they have suffered. Consider the case of discrimination
claimants, some of whom desire to “go public” and make big state-
ments on their cases and others who prefer some privacy (AIDS vic-
tims, gays or transsexual claimants, some rape and war crimes
victims).
Thus, in a modern world characterized by “process pluralism,” is
it possible to develop generalized, universal and robust ethics princi-
ples across process differences? Is the act of “designing” processes suf-
ficiently coherent and uniform to allow general principles, even if the
processes designed are themselves different or pluralistic?
A. Domestic Cases: Mass Torts and Organizational Design
Consider what we have heard at this Symposium from Kenneth
Feinberg, designer of the September 11 Victim’s Compensation
Fund.52 Designed to swiftly and fairly allocate a relatively open-en-
ded and significant amount of money provided by the government to
victims, survivors and family members of the World Trade Center
51. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR’S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH AN-
NUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (Mark L. Kahn ed. 1962); Lon L.
Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971); LON L.
FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Ken-
neth I. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001).
52. See generally September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R.
§ 104.1-6, .21-.22, .31-.35, .41-.47, .51-.52, .61-.63, .71 (2003) (outlining claim process
for the fund); KENNETH FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EF-
FORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2006) (describing the difficulty in compen-
sating families of 9/11 victims).
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terrorist attack, the Victims’ Compensation Fund used an arbitral
process. But, as Special Master Feinberg has indicated on more than
one occasion, what many of the family members wanted was an op-
portunity to tell their story, to narrate the value of their loved one’s
life—perhaps suggesting a more mediative or “narrative” dispute res-
olution process, in a situation that was not very adversarial.
In contrast, with a similar desire to narrate (but in private) their
injuries, the claimants I saw in the Dalkon Shield mass tort claims
facility (also in an arbitral, but more adversarial context, with ex-
tremely limited funds to be allocated) also would have preferred a
more mediative, less adversarial process. While some victims, survi-
vors and family members of mass tort injuries, through single events
(building collapses, natural disasters, man-made disasters) or more
gradual processes (defective products, chemicals or environmental
degradation) desire public hearings, others desire privacy.
In a creative attempt to design a particularly innovative process,
Judge Sam Pointer, who presided over the Multi-District Litigation
in the Silicon Breast Implant Litigation,53 sought mediator-like con-
sultants and counselors to advise claimants of their legal rights
under a proposed settlement in private and group settings,54 varied
by client desires for privacy or group solidarity.
In other cases of mass injury some claimants have desired more
public fora—victims or family members of injuries due to some medi-
cal products (heart valves, diet plans), or environmental disasters
(Love Canal, Buffalo Creek dam disaster,55 Woburn, Massachusetts
water pollution56) have preferred high profile lawsuits or well publi-
cized settlements.57 Some have wanted to resist the now common de-
sign device of establishing “grids” of settlement that achieve fairness
53. In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 705 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich. 1997) (paying
claims after bankruptcy in class action settlement).
54. I was one of these consultants. The innovative design for this mass tort was
derailed by both the expert’s report on scientific causation and bankruptcy proceed-
ings for Dow Corning. See, e.g., Eric Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication
Ends? We’ll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1773 (1997); Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty:
The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1587 (1995); Francis McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settle-
ments of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995).
55. See generally GERALD STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: HOW THE SURVI-
VORS OF ONE OF THE WORST DISASTERS IN COAL-MINING HISTORY BROUGHT SUIT AGAINST
THE COAL COMPANY—AND WON (1974).
56. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996).
57. Many of these mass injuries and the subsequent litigation have spawned a
variety of books and commentaries. Sometimes the critics and authors (who are either
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by quantifying injuries and regularizing payments (as in worker’s
compensation schemes).58  Critics of the use of ADR in the mass tort
arena or of settlement generally continue to insist that every case of
wrongful injury be exposed to public process and trial.59
Thus, in the context of aggregate injury claims (as contrasted to
the slightly simpler aggregate consumer, stock, and antitrust claims
which are perhaps easier to monetize and quantify) there are likely to
be variations in the desires of claimants for types of processes (public
vs. private; fast and final (arbitration) vs. more narrative and cathar-
tic (mediation or some hybrid thereof); as well as type of relief (com-
pensation, accountability, apologies, storytelling, changed practices)).
When coupled with the great variety of contexts of mass claims (natu-
ral and man-made single disasters, more gradual degradation,60
product design defects, etc.) and variations in the pool from which
relief may be granted (limited funds, bankrupts, market share, insur-
ance funded, government funded, less limited resources), the possible
kinds of DSD are enormous if not infinite.
In the early years of mass torts, DSDers (including symposium
participants Francis McGovern and Kenneth Feinberg and others
working with ENDISPUTE61 and JAMS62) tended to replicate a few
simple plans (grids of payments for “mature” torts, hearing processes
of arbitration to establish some claims, aggregate settlements with
lawyers or journalists) make clear their own preferences for more public litigation,
without necessarily polling or questioning the claimants. See, e.g., RICHARD SOBOL,
BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
58. Efforts to establish a national claims fund for the hundreds of thousands of
victims of asbestos lung disease have failed in almost every Congress for the last
twenty years. This legal claim, perhaps the largest mass tort ever, continues to fill
courthouses (in hundreds of thousands of cases) at both federal and state levels and to
result in delayed individual and collective settlements, in my view because of the in-
flexibility of the American legal system (and Rule 23 class action law in particular) to
adapt to such mass claims. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note  54. See also American
Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Samuel Issacharoff,
Richard Nagareda, Robert H. Klonoff and Charles Silver, Reporters, 2009)
59. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 54; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement,  93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619 (1995); cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philo-
sophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in some cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663
(1995) (discussing the difficulties in choosing between settlement and adjudication of
disputes).
60. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to Let’s Talk: Comments on Collaborative
Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835, 844 (2008).
61. ENDISPUTE was one of the first private organizations to offer dispute sys-
tem design. Formed by a group of lawyers, including Professor Eric Green (currently
at Boston University Law School), this private firm provided the design ideas for
“mini-trials” and other process innovations for large scale, usually corporate disputes.
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class lawyers with the responsibility for payment allocation), with va-
rying degrees of court monitoring and intervention.63 More modern
designs for mass claims (torts, consumer, anti-trust, securities) have
been a bit more creative and varied, including auctions for class law-
yers, in-kind, non-cash settlements or discounts on future goods or
services (airline tickets, products, etc.), which suggests that process
(and outcome) pluralism has come to the field of aggregate litigation
and mass claims settlements.
Given the increasing diversity of designs for both process and
outcomes, I wonder whether it is possible or desirable to craft ethical
rules for this line of work. In my view, as both an ethicist and a
proceduralist, I wonder whether, at least in the case of mass claims
that could be or are litigated, some of these issues would better be
dealt with by procedural rules for accountability, transparency, and
due process, as are currently being drafted by the Reporters for the
ALI Project on Aggregate Litigation (both restating the law and offer-
ing suggestions and solutions to legal issues in class litigation, in-
cluding proposed revisions to Rule 23, attorney selection and fees,
judicial approval of settlements and relief to be granted).64 At least in
this context there is the possibility of some court review of such is-
sues as:
ENDISPUTE and lawyers in private firms, as well as government agencies also pro-
vided advice on the development of internal grievance and organizational dispute res-
olution systems as a way to structure “preventative dispute resolution” and reduce
litigation expenses for their clients.
62. Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services  (JAMS) was founded in Orange
County, California by retired state court judge Warren Knight in the 1980s  and ulti-
mately grew from an organization primarily offering arbitration services by retired
judges in California, to a national organization with offices in many major cities, of-
fering mediation, arbitration, training, and dispute system design services by
mediators, arbitrators, former judges, and other dispute resolution professionals. See
www.JAMSADR.com (last visited May 20, 2009). JAMS merged with ENDISPUTE
(and several other ADR provider organizations in the late 1990s and early 2000’s) to
become one of the largest private providers of ADR services in the United States.
There are many other provider organizations including the National Academy of Arbi-
trators (primarily labor arbitrators), the Center for Public Resources, the American
Arbitration Association, and many others.
63. Indeed, although it is somewhat beyond the scope of this essay, serious ethi-
cal questions could be (and have been) raised about the selection and accountability of
those who designed mass tort systems for the courts, (often serving as Special Mas-
ters under Rule 53, Fed. R. Civ. Proc.). See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gen-
der, and Legal Pedagogy: An Experiment in a Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown
University Law Center,  83 GEO. L.J. 461 (1994) (reporting on the under-representa-
tion of women as special masters).
64. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Sa-
muel Issacharoff, Richard Nagareda, Robert H. Klonoff and Charles Silver, Reporters,
2009)
\\server05\productn\H\HNR\14-1\HNR111.txt unknown Seq: 23 22-JUL-09 13:27
Winter 2009] Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design 217
1. Selection of the DSDer (or Special Master under Rule 53);
2. Monitoring of attorney/representative behavior;
3. Class certification hearings for determinations of representa-
tiveness of parties, lawyers, party preferences;
4. Hearings on proposed processes and settlements and finally;
5. Some monitoring of the fairness of actual processes and set-
tlements  (Rule 23 (e).65
At least in this context, there is some possibility of public hearings
and court monitoring. Increasingly, some state court systems are
promulgating standards and requirements for their court
mediators.66 I recognize that this does not fully account for those
mass claims settlement processes that are privately bargained for or
fully negotiated in the shadow, not the light, of the courthouse67 and
that is why some urge that dispute designers develop ethics
standards.68
In addition to domestic mass dispute litigation matters, dispute
designers work for public and private organizations, corporations,
government entities, and educational institutions and also design
dispute processes for both ongoing and ad hoc matters, especially
those involving multiple parties, such as in environmental disputes.
Some who do this work, such as Ombuds who handle, manage, and
65. See requirements of Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613
(1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 827-28 (1999).
66. See e.g., Memorandum from Heather Anderson & Alan Wiener, Staff Counsel,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Subcommittee, Civil and Small Claims Advisory Com-
mittee, Judicial Council of California, to members of the Administrative Office of the
Courts, Judicial Council of California (May 6, 2008) (on file with the author).
67. Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation and Fairness, 54 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1 (1993).
68. Some of the major private providers of dispute and dispute design services
have promulgated internal ethics codes for their members. See e.g. CPR Commission
on Ethics and Standards for the Third Party Neutral and CPR Provider Principles,
supra note 11; JAMS Ethics Guidelines for Mediators and Arbitrators; http:// R
www.jamsadr.com (last visited May 20, 2009); American Arbitration Association, Eth-
ics for Commercial Arbitration, Ethics for Mediators, and Guidelines for Arbitrators
Concerning Exchanges of Information in International Commercial Arbitration,
www.adr.org/icdr (including such matters as informing parties about process, volun-
tary participation of parties, competency of third party neutral, confidentiality, im-
partiality, refraining from giving legal advice, situations indicating withdrawals and
avoidance of misleading marketing). There are also ethics standards that have been
jointly promulgated by several organizations, such as AAA, ABA, CPR Ethics Rules
for Commercial Arbitration; AAA, ABA, ACR, CPR, Standards of Conduct for
Mediators.  To my knowledge there is no currently existing set of standards or rules
for dispute system design, even for those organizations that specialize in dispute de-
sign and multi-party facilitation, see e.g., http://www.policyconsensus.org (last visited
May 20, 2009).
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design conflict resolution systems have established some very basic
ethical guidelines or standards69 including such matters as:
1. Maintaining confidentiality;
2. Maintaining impartiality and neutrality;
3. Maintaining independence (from management); and
4. Remaining an informal process (no participation in formal
adjudicative matters).70
Other groups or organizations who design dispute systems in situa-
tions like environmental disputes (among competing groups) have
suggested some basic rules and principles including:
1. Determine what process is appropriate for the situation;
2. Ensure appropriate parties participate in the process (or
process design);
3. Engage an appropriate third party to facilitate or guide (or
design) the process;
4. Ensure that parties have full capacity to participate;
5. Ensure that process/third party adds value in the situation;
6. Ensure that relevant information is incorporated into the
process;
7. Ensure that participants can effectively communicate and
collaborate and hear each other’s views and perspectives in
order to improve understanding of each other and any prob-
lem situation; and
8. Ensure any agreement achieved be long-lasting, imple-
mentable and of high quality;
9. Measure and assess impact;
10. Enhance participants and parties ability to resolve
conflicts;
11. Ensure processes used are efficient and effective when com-
pared to most likely alternatives;
12. Ensure benefits of a process (or design) outweigh the costs;
and
13. Ensure party satisfaction and public benefits to the
processes used.71
69. See e.g. www.ombudsassociation.org/standards.
70. These basic guidelines are supplemented by a fuller set of standards of prac-
tice and a list of “best practices.” See http://www.ombudsassociation.org (last visited
May 20, 2009).
71. See Patricia Orr, Kirk Emerson & Dale Keyes, Environmental Conflict Reso-
lution Practice and Performance: An Evaluation Framework, 25 (3) CONFLICT. RES. Q.
283 (2008).
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Such general standards could be adapted for DSDers but are not
likely to help deal with or resolve some of the more difficult issues
described above, such as possible conflicts of interests between man-
agers who hire a dispute system professional and those who will be
the end users, such as employees or customers (efficiency and cost
savings versus full hearings, documentation, and compensation). In
many organizational settings, managers seek to establish dispute
systems to develop fair, but cost-efficient processes in situations
where employees, unions or others might want to pursue or preserve
external dispute resolution rights.72 These issues present complex
questions of judgment, experience, and both personal and political
values.
B. International DSD
All of the issues reviewed above are compounded when one turns
to implementation of DSD in transnational or international settings.
Several other panels at the Symposium have focused specifically on
institutional design and legitimacy in international disputing and
constitution drafting,73 whether focused on very formal systems for
dispute resolution like constitutional allocations of governmental
power at both the international and national level (courts, interna-
tional tribunals) or the less formal processes used in inter-state con-
flicts (diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, appeals panels) or intra-
state conflicts (truth and reconciliation commissions, consociative
governments and power sharing74 etc.).
I am skeptical of any efforts to generate sufficiently helpful nor-
mative standards for international  DSD at this point in the develop-
ment of the field because of the wide variety of contexts, situations,
and cultures, which are involved at the international level.
I begin with an observation that I am not alone in making: with-
out a strong and enforceable international legal order, backed up
72. See Lauren Edelman, Howard Erlanger, John Lande, Internal Dispute Reso-
lution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOCIETY REV.
497 (1993) (work critical of “I(nternal) Dispute Resolution”); Laura Nader, Controlling
Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-
form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. OF DISP. RES. 1 (1993) (criticizing “harmony cul-
ture” and its proliferation through legal and dispute resolution process reform).
73. Panel Discussion at the Harvard Negotiation Law Review Symposium: Dis-
pute System Design on a Global Scale (March 7, 2008); Panel Discussion at the
Harvard Negotiation Law Review Symposium: A Constitutional Issue: DSD at the
Birth of a Nation (March 7, 2008).
74. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin, Ethnic Conflict: Flemings and Wallloons, Palestini-
ans and Israeli 136 DAEDALUS 103 (2007); AREND LIPHART, POWER SHARING IN SOUTH
AFRICA (1985).
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with effective courts or peace-enforcing mechanisms and “the rule of
law,” international dispute design does not have the backbone of de-
fault enforcement of courts and legitimate institutions on which do-
mestic dispute design depends (if only as a shadowy “threat” of an
alternative command process).75 Despite the increasing caseloads of a
number of international tribunals (particularly those dealing with
human rights) and the effective development of new international in-
stitutions, like the World Trade Organization Appellate Body,76 there
are few effective enforcement mechanisms for trans-national or inter-
national disputes (though they are getting better, both courts and in-
formal sanctions, at enforcing some notions of “rule of law”). Some
would argue that without strong and effective formal institutions the
design of voluntary, informal, and multiple systems for dispute reso-
lution should flourish, offering “alternatives” where there may be
none in formal settings. Nevertheless, enforcement of any set of stan-
dards or guidelines of behavior for informal dispute processes are not
likely to be formally enforceable, if there are no formal institutions to
enforce substantive agreements.77
There is, of course, the most effective form of regulation of ethical
conduct: reputation, which is self-enforcing or market driven.78 But
in a field as new and dispersed as international DSD, information
about activities generating an “ethical” reputation may be hard to
come by.
More importantly, in international contexts we may not have
agreement on some of the most basic, core values: peace at any cost,
punishment of wrong doers, forgiveness, precedent setting, standard
articulation, private vs. public proceedings, formal vs. informal mech-
anisms and institutions, local (indigenous) vs. national, regional or
75. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions In Interna-
tional and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons From General Theory and Varied
Contexts, J. OF DISP. L. RES. 319 (2003) at 348-349; Schneider, supra note 24;  Andrea
Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dispute Resolution is
Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2006); JANE STROMSETH, DAVID
WIPPMAN, ROSA EHRENREICH BROOKS,  CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE
OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTION (2006); Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams,
Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004).
76. JOHN JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE
CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006);  Andrea Schneider, Getting
Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in the International Trade Orga-
nizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697 (1999).
77. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9. R
78. See generally Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process,
64 NYU L. REV. 494 (1989).
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international locuses of dispute resolution fora, compensation, apolo-
gies, rights of past (right of return) vs. present (compensation) vs.
future (affirmative action, land rights, social welfare, etc.).
In recent years I have been researching and teaching in several
countries that have experienced either serious internal conflict
(through violent conflicts or military dictatorships), or transitions to
democracy and the development of new legal systems. While my work
so far is preliminary,79 it has persuaded me that there is so much
variation in what individuals, collectivities at all levels, sub-groups,
and nation-states hope to accomplish with dispute resolution that
any effort to suggest ethical guidelines, by us in an academic-practi-
tioner community in the United States, for other cultures, nations
and groups, is presumptuous and premature. If I had only several
“canons of ethics” to suggest they would be:
1) be truly sensitive to local conditions and “thick descriptions of
cultures”80 in all their variety;
2) Do no harm; and
3) Make no assumptions about what people want.
I will illustrate very briefly with some very complex examples.
While Desmond Tutu and South Africa get most of the credit for im-
plementing a mostly successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in post-apartheid South Africa,81 the first Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions actually were formed in South America, first in Bolivia,
then Chile and Argentina, followed by Guatemala and El Salvador.82
79. The larger project is called “Cultural Variations in Restorative Justice”.
80. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1977).
81. Actually both the academic and practical debate about how successful this
TRC actually was is growing larger. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES:
JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER
(2003); James Gibson, OVERCOMING APARTHEID; CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED NA-
TION? (2004); PENNY ANDREWS & STEPHEN ELLMAN, THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITU-
TION: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA’S BASIC LAW (2002); DESMOND TUTU, NO
FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999). Some of the criticism suggests that important
perpetrators did not participate; that too much amnesty was granted, that a Christian
and African tribal culture of “forgiveness” was used as social control to prevent more
anger and greater demands for accountability, and that social and economic justice
remain very far from being realized. See Kevin Avruch and B. Vejarano, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 2 (1-2)
SOC. JUSTICE, ANTHROPOLOGY. PEACE AND HUMAN RTS. 47 (2001).
82. See generally PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITIES (2001); ERIN DALY, JEREMY SARKIN, RECONCILIATION IN DI-
VIDED SOCIETIES: FINDING COMMON GROUND (2007); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VEN-
GEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE
(1998).
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These Truth and Reconciliation Commissions operated in very
different ways. With the transition to democracy in Chile, many of
the former military dictatorship members remained in power. Mili-
tary dictator Augustin Pinochet called an election to test his own le-
gitimacy in office. He was in office from the 1973 coup d’etat against
socialist leader Salvador Allende until the election in 1986 (surpris-
ingly for him) defeated his request for electoral legitimacy. Pinochet,
unlike most military dictators, left office relatively peacefully, while
much of the military, including Pinochet, remained in power (he as a
Life Senator) and amnesty laws were passed to ease the transition
with the new democratic regime. As dramatized in Ariel Dorfman’s
famous play, Death and the Maiden,83 the Chilean TRC focused only
on deaths and very serious torture and did not deal with many of the
other thousands of serious detentions, beatings and other human
rights violations. The Chilean process consisted of semi-private hear-
ings of those who came forward to testify and a well documented set
of files kept during the military dictatorship by the Jesuit Order and
currently housed in a Human Rights Library at Alberto Hurtado
Universidad in Santiago, Chile. The published report of the Commis-
sions findings may be found,84 with some effort, in a few libraries but
is not readily available.  In recent years, Chile, like Argentina, has
begun to rescind some of the amnesty laws (through court, as well as
legislative action) and some military officers (and priests who as-
sisted the regime) are coming to trial. As is well known, Pinochet was
indicted in Spain and incarcerated in the United Kingdom,85 where
he was eventually deported back to Chile (on humanitarian grounds
for illness,86) and  died without being tried for his human rights vio-
lations. Chile is now heralded as one of the most successful transi-
tions to democracy with a coalition government of the center-left
party, Concertacion, currently headed by President Michele Bachelet,
herself a victim of human rights violations (imprisonment and some
torture) during the Pinochet regime (and during which her military
83. See ARIEL DORFMAN, DEATH AND THE MAIDEN 9 (1991); movie version DEATH
AND THE MAIDEN (Roman Polanski, director, 1994). See also David Luban, On Dorf-
man’s Death and the Maiden, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115, 117-18 (1998).
84. CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, REPORT OF
THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Ber-
ryman trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1993) (1991).
85. ARIEL DORFMAN, EXORCISING TERROR: THE INCREDIBLE UNENDING TRIAL OF
GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET 40 (2002).
86. In a great “thumb nose” to the human rights community, Pinochet, though he
argued he was too ill to stand trial, proudly walked from the plane, unassisted, when
he arrived in Chile to great cheers by his still remaining supporters, see id. at 128-29,
131.
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officer father was murdered). Pinochet’s family is being pursued in
the courts for tax crimes. Nevertheless, it was common from those I
interviewed (except a few of my most left or progressive friends and
informants, including many who had grown up in exile in Europe, the
United States or ironically, Argentina because their fathers were in
the deposed Allende government87) that the Pinochet regime had led
to economic success with the reforms of the “Chicago boys” and free
market economics.88 Pinochet’s daughter talked of running for office
in the Senate to replace her deceased father and many in Chile work-
ing on human rights complained of “collective amnesia” in the desire
to move forward, through economic success, and “forget the past.”
Members of the military dictatorship government continued to serve
in the government for some years. While transition to democracy has
been quite successful in Chile, there has been less abrupt a departure
of the old regime in Chile than in many other nations making transi-
tions to new regimes, such as in neighboring Argentina where the
military leadership was totally removed from power following the un-
successful “War of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands)” in 1983. And, it
should be pointed out, as horrible as he was,89 Pinochet left office
voluntarily after an election.
In contrast, the shorter lived military dictatorship in Argentina
(known as “the Dirty War” which lasted from 1976-1983, ending with
the loss of the Falklands-Malvinas War) has produced a “longer mem-
ory” in Argentina. Newly elected president Raul Alfonsin asked legal
scholar and jurisprudence expert Carlos Santiago Nino90 to assist in
the transition to democracy. The Truth and Reconciliation process in
Argentina was designed to be more public and had greater scope than
that of Chile’s.  The Report of the Commission of the Disappeared
Persons (CONADEP), Nunca Mas! has had over 25 printings, with at
87. See, e.g., ARIEL DORFMAN, HEADING SOUTH, LOOKING NORTH: A BILINGUAL
JOURNEY (1998); MATILDE URRUTIA, MY LIFE WITH PABLO NERUDA (Alexandria
Giardino trans., Stanford General Books, 2004) (1986); MARC COOPER, PINOCHET AND
ME: A CHILEAN ANTI-MEMOIR (2001).
88. YVES DEZALAY, BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 141-
42 (2002).
89. It is estimated that 3,000 died at the hands of the Pinochet military govern-
ment and thousands more were detained and tortured, SAMUEL TOTTEN ET AL., DIC-
TIONARY OF GENOCIDE 331 (2008).
90. Who spent part of the Dirty War years teaching at Yale Law School and was
(he is now deceased) still writing significant works of jurisprudence, see, e.g., CARLOS
SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); CARLOS SAN-
TIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Duty to Punish
Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J.
2619 (1991).
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least 300,000 copies sold as of the time of this writing. It is available
in any bookstore and in most street-side news kiosks in Buenos Aires.
Like Ariel Dorfman’s powerful play, Death and the Maiden (which is
not set in Chile but in a nameless South American country that could
be Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, or Uruguay, all of which had
military dictatorships in the 1970s), powerful memoirs,91 films,92
literature,93 and continuing political action by a group of human
rights NGOs that developed to fight the human rights abuses, serve
to keep the memory more or less fresh in Argentina so that, it will not
happen again. Most distinctively, in Argentina, the Madres de Plaza
de Mayo (mostly grandmothers of the disappeared) began a march to
protest their children and grandchildren’s forced disappearances dur-
ing the dictatorship, and they continue to march to the present time
(every Thursday in the Plaza de Mayo). They have founded a human
rights organization that supports various activities to commemorate
and protest human rights violations.94 In Argentina, a movement
and legal action to learn the truth of the birth of about 500 children
(now in their 30’s or more) who were stolen from their detained and
murdered mothers and given to military families is currently ac-
tive.95 Argentina has repealed many of its amnesty laws, and prose-
cutions in about 15 cases are currently ongoing with both public and
private prosecutors. (In many civil law systems, including Argentina,
victims have their own representatives who assist in the prosecu-
tion). Wherever I go in Argentina (I have taught there regularly and
once in Chile) the military dictatorship comes up in conversation very
quickly. Argentineans do not have “collective amnesia.” Although cer-
tainly there are many conservatives who approved of the military re-
gimes (at the time when many supported military regimes’ promises
of order against the perceived violence of communist revolutions),96
91. See e.g., JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A
NUMBER (Toby Talbot trans., University of Wisconsin Press, 2002) (1980).
92. See e.g., THE OFFICIAL STORY (Luis Puenzo, director, 1986).
93. See, e.g., the powerful novel based on real events, NATHAN ENGLANDER, THE
MINISTRY OF SPECIAL CASES (2007).
94. See JO FISHER, MOTHERS OF THE DISAPPEARED xi, xiii, 95 (1989).
95. See among other sources the films, The Official Story, supra note 92 and Our
Disappeared (Juan Mandelbaum, 2008) dramatizing this situation, and the public
service film Identidad Perdida (2007)  (illustrating the process of rediscovering one’s
real parents).
96. Che Guevara is now a world wide symbol of liberation and socialist revolu-
tion. His face is everywhere in Argentina. But it is important to remember that even
though he was many people’s hero (including mine, in my more activist youth), he
believed in violence to overthrow capitalist governments and many, especially those
with land and money, feared violent and confiscatory political movements. Commen-
tators suggest that most of South America has now found a “third way” with coalition
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the break with military government was much sharper in Argentina
than Chile.
There is much more detail to both of these important stories
which I have simplified and very briefly recounted here. My point is
that Chile and Argentina, speaking the same language, separated by
a mountain range, have widely different cultures. Argentina, like the
United States, is a nation constituted by  European immigration. It is
stunningly white, with small metizo populations, and still looks to
the past to its glory days of  having the ninth largest economy in the
world (1920s) and to European notions of justice and law. Though
both share a civil law system and a Spanish and Catholic colonial
history, these nations have approached their somewhat similar politi-
cal experience of military dictatorships differently.
To generalize, one culture continues to mine their memory and to
seek justice;97 the other seeks to move forward with economic growth
and plans for the future. I do not sit in judgment of these different
approaches. As a student of restorative justice (from my own history
as a child of Holocaust refugees) I know there are many ways to pro-
cess the past.98 Some are obsessed by it; some draw a dark curtain
and choose to forget. Some seek punishment, incarceration, and per-
manent memorials; others “turn the other cheek,” grant forgiveness,
and move to create a new political system, culture or society. Some
demand reparations and “rights of return” for lives, land and other
losses. Others emigrate and seek to build new lives in new places. In
a stunning and, similarly overly simplistic cultural sweep, travel
journalist Colin Thubron recently wrote the following after traveling
through China and Russia:
The Gulag commissars had retired long ago, with medals and
pensions. Not one had been arraigned. Russia had turned its
governments and mixes of socialist, capitalist, and hybrid political regimes (consider
the wide berth of Peronism). See generally MICHAEL REID, THE FORGOTTEN CONTI-
NENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN AMERICA’S SOUL 264-92 (2007) (discussing Latin Ameri-
can countries as “flawed democracies” influenced by a variety of political systems).
97. There are many forms of justice, of course. I refer here to the argument that
justice can only be served by formal court proceedings, prosecutions and punish-
ments, see, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542-44 (1991) (in dialogue
with Nino, supra note 90),
98. See generally AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY (2002); EVA HOFF-
MAN, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE, MEMORY, HISTORY, AND THE LEGACY OF THE HOLO-
CAUST (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The
Relationship of Past to Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 97 (2004).
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back on the past. And I, how could I understand? Since the Hol-
ocaust, my world had made a duty of remembrance. Russia, like
China, had chosen forgetfulness. That, said the writer
Shalamov, was how people survived. A nation was not built on
truth.99
In time we may learn that the greatest human rights violations
of the twentieth century were not those of the Nazis in Europe, or the
Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, or Stalin’s purges, or the South Ameri-
can dictatorships. It is just possible that we may learn that tens of
millions perished during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution100 without the bureaucratic efficiency and accountability
of names and numbers of the Germans or South American dictators.
Yet, so far, China appears to be following a strategy closer to Chile’s
–some individual rehabilitations when the need for educated com-
rades returned101—but mostly a focus on economic growth, western-
ization and modernization, where economic success is supposed to
make up for or dull the senses to human rights violations.102
Many of the political regimes that created the worst atrocities in
the twentieth century have created some of the best new processes in
the twenty first.  While I was in Chile, I observed native Mapuche
land claims (disputes within Mapuche communities) mediated by a
government agency (CONADI103) in the field, on the land, that sensi-
tively and with full community participation negotiated land and dis-
puted family claims.104 In Argentina, I observed one of the most
progressive forms of prisoner rehabilitation—contained at a maxi-
mum security prison within the city limits of Buenos Aires, a fully
99. COLIN THUBRON, THE SHADOW OF THE SILK ROAD  204-05  (2007).
100. Evidence to support this claim exists, see the memoir of Mao’s doctor, LI ZHI-
SUI, THE PRIVATE LIFE OF CHAIRMAN MAO (1994) AND JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY,
MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (2006).
101. See, e.g., JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA  (1991).
102. PHILIP PAN, OUT OF MAO’S SHADOW: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A NEW
CHINA  (2008).
103. Corporacio´n Nacional de Desarrollo Indı´gena.
104. This will be the subject of a separate article, but I should mention that this
excellent mediation program, run by government lawyers committed to indigenous
people is necessitated by Pinochet’s land policies. Unlike U.S. treatment of indigenous
populations with land removal to reservations, Pinochet “privatized” Mapuche land,
granting many Mapuche families a limited number of hectares of land for them to
“produce” with economic individualism (not joint ownership). Now in their third gen-
eration, heirs of the original beneficiaries have disputes about their shares of land.
The government-run mediation program settles land claims with consent, and actu-
ally goes further in “deep, facilitative” mediation to help the parties mediate their
internal family issues. That, however, is a story for another day. The hero of that
story is Lohengrin Ascensio, a lawyer-mediator with CONADI who has mediated
thousands of these cases.
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operational branch of the prestigious Universidad de Buenos Aires
grants five degrees to self-governing prisoners—in law,105 economics,
sociology, psychology and humanities, all taught in the prison by reg-
ular UBA professors. Can you imagine such programs in the United
States?
In South Africa, unlike most of the Central and South American
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, testimony and proceedings
were publicly televised. Political scientist James Gibson’s work docu-
ments that those who watched the programming developed a height-
ened sense of “human rights consciousness” and a belief that citizens
were entitled to justice, even though reactions to the “justness” of the
South African TRC in particular were still largely correlated with
race, color and class.106
These progressive and varied processes of dispute resolution or
restorative justice each present specific ethical issues of their own.
Can a well designed and executed mediation program be considered
just when it is operated by a successor government to the government
that created great injustice (by allocating land unfairly to begin
with)? How does a progressive rehabilitative prison program allocate
its limited places which promise a possibly successful new life?
Should a TRC promise amnesty for confession? What should be done
when perpetrators do not participate?
There is an ever expanding set of possible conflicts and disputes
in the international arena; some internal to a wide variety of coun-
tries, others crossing boundaries, whether intentionally or uninten-
tionally (as when refugee situations are created by those fleeing
genocides or other abuses). Some of these I have personally wit-
nessed, others are more remote, but equally challenging – all are dif-
ferent.  I have  recently spent time teaching conflict resolution in
Israel and working on and  thinking about the next process stages for
a “new” peace process among, for and with Israelis and Palestinians
and other Arabs.107 In the United States, we have many major past
105. Lawyers are qualified to practice after receiving a degree and performing an
internship. There is no bar exam or morals committee. So successful graduates have
undertaken their internships on day release from the prison and can become fully
qualified attorneys. As of this writing, the program has produced about 60 law gradu-
ates. In the sociology department (within the prison) pictures of Mao, Che, Durkheim
and Marx were hung in the self-governing classroom office. I was given a newsletter,
written by prison students, on Foucaldian cultural analysis, worthy of any graduate
student in a prestigious sociology department in Europe or the United States.
106. GIBSON, supra note 81. R
107. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Irena Nutenko, The Next Generation: A New
Peace Process in the Middle East by Those Who Live There (forthcoming NEG. J., Octo-
ber, 2009).
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disputes to reconcile – reparations for slavery, and “conquest” of in-
digenous peoples, internment of Japanese-Americans in WW II,108
and more recently,  unlawful detention and torture of terror war de-
tainees, not to mention more mass torts and aggregate injuries of va-
rious sorts.
Countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, Kosovo,
Bosnia, Serbia, East Timor and Cambodia are struggling with transi-
tions to new, and hopefully more democratic and better regimes for
their peoples. Some have opted for prosecutions (some of which are
international as with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia,109 others of which are both national and local,
such as in Rwanda and Cambodia, and others of which are mixed
jurisdictionally, such as in East Timor),110 while others  have chosen
Truth and Reconciliation processes or local healing processes, like
Rwanda’s inkiko-gacaca.111
IV. CONCLUSION?
What emerges, for me, from these great variations in human
wrongdoing and right-seeking, is that clearly one size or one process
does not and cannot fit all. As dispute resolution process profession-
als, we know a lot about dispute processing and we have structured a
variety of forms and processes such as “multi-door courthouses,” hy-
brids like med-arb or arb-med, negotiated rule-making, reg-neg and
multi-party consensus building fora. If we have learned anything it is
that modern process is plural and varied. The “appropriateness” of
the process depends on the numbers of parties, whether they are in
continuing or one-shot or ending relationships, whether they are dis-
puting scarce or divisible or sharable resources, whether they want to
resolve their disputes privately among themselves or to educate the
public, change the rules or begin a new relationship or society. Some
disputes are private; others involve the government or important
public policy issues. Some disputes are very serious and affect life
108. One of the few groups to actually receive reparations so far, by act of
Congress.
109. See e.g., JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL  (2003).
110. See JANE STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 75. R
111. Catherine Honeyman et al., Establishing Collective Norms:  Potentials for
Participatory Justice in Rwanda, 10 Peace & Conflict: J. of the Amer. Psychological
Ass’n. 1, 13 (2004);  Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative
Justice Dispute Resolution Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1
(2005);  Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional
Justice, J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 364  (2004).
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and death; others are purely monetary or may seem more “minor.”
These variations in process have been formed, matured, and varied in
the last 30 years and we are still creating new forms of process as
new disputes and conflicts present themselves.
Within each conflict or dispute setting, will be victims, survivors,
or other injured who may differ among themselves about what they
want. Any choice of any one process may advantage or disadvantage
both particular collectivities and certainly, particular individuals.
Not to make any choice at all advantages the guilty or those who
have committed some wrong. Ethical issues in international DSD are
legion, at both macro and micro levels.
Ethics standards, guidelines, and even rules for professional dis-
cipline and sanction have now been promulgated for mediators, arbi-
trators, and even negotiators by private professional associations,
courts and international organizations.112 I suspect that it would be
possible to adapt some of these standards for the deliverers of these
services for those who design systems of dispute resolution, but as an
ethicist and as a practitioner in this field, I think it is simply too early
to inductively collect our cases, with the vividness of the few exam-
ples we have of ethical difficulties, as illustrated here. And, in my
view, our contexts, locations, and types of dispute design are, in my
opinion, too varied to permit the generation of usable specific deduc-
tive ethical principles. If I had to craft a few general rules of thumb
for the well-meaning process designer, they would be simply:
1. Do no harm—do not make the parties worse off than they
were before you were hired. Don’t make waste (Cost and ex-
penses without benefits).
2. Do not become a “tool” of a client or organization or govern-
ment that wants to use process design to achieve inappro-
priate or illegitimate ends (deterring rightful complaints,
manipulating workers or customers, “cooling” out or ignor-
ing claims).
3. Be sure that the end users of any dispute system have had
input into the design. (This suggests full participation and
bottom-up sensitivity, rather than control by “top-down” of-
ficials of organizations, institutions and governments).
112. Not only the International Mediation Institute which seeks to credential in-
ternational mediators, but the International Bar Association has developed a very
sophisticated set of Guidelines for Conflicts of Interests in International Commercial
Arbitration. See http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e2fe5e
72-eb14-4bba-b10d-d33dafee8918 (last visited May 20, 2009).
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4. Attempt to ensure that any process you design can actually
accomplish what it was designed to do. Take some responsi-
bility for implementation and evaluation.
5. Know what participants’ legal rights are (and what they
might be giving up or waiving to participate in a particular
system).
6. Be sure, as much as you can, that a system of dispute reso-
lution does not systematically discriminate against or harm
particular individuals.
7. Be prepared and be competent. Learn about particular or-
ganizations, cultures, groups, and histories before embark-
ing on a design project.
8. Consider whether processes should include multiple
choices, menus, gateways or tiers. One size does not fit all,
even within the same organization, nation-state, and cul-
ture. Individuals will have different preferences even
within affinity or other groups.
9. Ensure that any process designed can be adequately ex-
plained to and understood by its users.
10. Suggest that any system designed should be evaluated and
revised as conditions change.
And that’s about it for my 10 commandments of DSD. Pre-publication
readers have suggested that these canons are either too vague or too
aspirational and impossible to achieve and enforce.  There is concern
that overly vague and platitudinous ethical canons which cannot be
enforced will undermine the entire enterprise of designing good
processes with clear standards of practice and evaluative criteria.
Yet, I think the elaboration of very specific guidelines or ethical stan-
dards is unlikely to be much better. Casuistic reasoners will be able
to distinguish their specific contexts and situations and argue (as do
lawyers and politicians) that particular rules just don’t apply in this
or that particular setting.
In my view, the limits of good or best practices and ethics (and
these may be different things) in this new field are still being framed
and developing. I leave to the next generation of DSDers to flesh
these out and add others as our experiences grow and we are able to
learn from each other. What we do or advise others to do now in the
liminal or transitional state we are in now is a difficult question.113
However, we went many years with no clear standards for mediation
113. I thank Bob Bordone for raising it.
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as that field developed, short of a few general ideas about what con-
stituted fairness (such as my overly broad and vague standards
above).
Make no mistake, however, I do think there are ethical issues,
dilemmas and limits in this new professional field, as there are in
any profession. We can only learn to be better at what we do when we
design processes for our own deliberation and learn about what those
ethical limits are or should be. I hope new examples and cases will
help us induce or deduce some clearer ethical standards, hopefully
with little or no harm to those we serve with our designs.
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